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with a wooden bar or portcullis, making passage impossible until the defenders posted there had been ousted or killed." [1]

In 1818–20 Yermolov commenced operations against the Chechens by the construction of the forts of Grozni ("Threatening") and Vnezapnaia ("Fort Surprise"), while the Armenian General Madatov reduced the Lesghian Khanates of Sheki (with Nukha), Kiuri (with Akhti), Tabasseran, Kara-Kaitagh, Kazi-Kumukh, Khuntzakh (the capital of the Avar), and Akusha (the capital of the Dargo) Khans. In 1822 the central part of the Line was advanced into the Kabardan country, and the tribesmen, ravaged by a fourteen-years' plague, were reduced with cruel severity. Two years later the Chechens were attacked, but succeeded in inflicting several small defeats on the Russians.

The tribes were thoroughly roused by the brutal methods of the Russians, who had marched over their hills, burning auls, carrying off flocks, destroying crops and levelling trees, and there now arose at Ghimri in Avar Daghestan two preachers, Kazi [2] Mullah and Sheikh Shamil, who initiated a movement, Muridism, which at first advocated religious reform, temperance and the cessation of blood-feuds, but soon developed into a fierce agitation, at once religious and political, against the Russians. A common danger had at last united the warring tribes, and the leaders of the movement appealed to that fanatical religious feeling which alone could bind together peoples lacking common national traditions and ideals. Shamil was the more remarkable, although Kazi Mullah, until his death, overshadowed him as Imam, or secular head of the Murids. Desperately brave, a devoted husband and father, Shamil was at the same time cruel, treacherous, and jealous of the success of his subordinate chiefs. He frequently showed himself not only a skilful partisan-leader but a clever strategist, while his success in uniting the tribes was due as much to his administrative and organising ability as to his personal magnetism and power of rousing the religious fervour of the mass of the mountaineers by rhetoric and by a clever assumption of religious sanctity. In the latter respect he has been compared to Muhammad, for he showed a deep knowledge of psychology and an understanding of dramatic effect in the mysterious ceremonies, personal flagellations and supposed communings with the Prophet by which he imposed on the credulity and ignorance of his followers. But as his courage, organising ability and cunning laid the foundations of his

[1] Baddeley, ch. xxxii.

[2] Properly Ghazi.

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success, so his cruelty, tyranny, injustice, jealousy and nepotism encompassed his downfall. He alone was responsible for the resistance against the best troops and generals of Russia during more than twenty-five years, but he too by his exactions and merciless discipline destroyed the *moral* of the mountaineers and the prestige of the Murids, and brought about the development of that state of mind which eventually made the tribes whom he had led in victory and defeat ready to desert him and to submit to Russian rule.

The history of the Russian war against the mountaineers is largely one of raids and counter-raids, of cruel destruction of crops and villages, of massacres and desperate sieges. In outline it may be divided into three phases: (1) 1829–39—including the campaigns of the first and second Imams, Kazi Mullah (1825–32) and Hamzad Beg (1832–4), the election of Shâmil as third Imam and the apparent extinction of his power after the Russian capture of his stronghold Akhulgo (1839): (2) 1840–49—covering the period of Shamil's greatest victories, when his authority extended from the Caspian to the Daryal and from Elisu to the walls of Grozni; and (3) 1850–59—when Shamil's popularity was gradually waning, and when the Russians were encroaching into the hitherto impassable mountains by a plan of campaign directed rather against nature than against Shamil, which comprehended the systematic levelling of forests and building of roads and bridges.

Space fails us wherein to describe the operations and the desperate fighting that took place during the first two of these periods. But an account of an eye-witness of the destruction of the great aul of Germenchug may be taken as showing the typical and magnificent courage of the mountaineers and the difficulties with which the Russians had to contend. "When the aul was in flames," says the narrator, "the Russian commander proposed to grant quarter to the survivors. The defenders listened to the proposal, conferred together for some minutes, and then a half-naked Chechen, black with smoke, came out and made a short speech, followed by a volley from all the loopholes. What he said was to this effect: 'We want no quarter; the only grace we ask of the Russians is to let our families know that we died as we lived, refusing submission to a foreign yoke.' Orders were now given to fire the houses from all sides. The sun had set and the picture of destruction and ruin was lighted only by the red glow of the flames. The Chechens, firmly resolved to die, set up their death-song, loud at first, but sinking lower and lower as their

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numbers diminished under the influence of fire and smoke." "With hearts like stones," concludes the narrator, "the victors sought the refuge of their tents; and maybe more than one in the depth of his being asked himself, why must such things be? Is there no room for all on this earth, without distinction of speech or faith?" [1]

During the third period (1850–59) the Russians confined themselves to the reduction of the Murids by slower but very efficacious means. In the south they built forts to protect the native States from all invasions; on the north they gradually advanced through Chechnia, and pursued a persistent policy of destroying the forests and of removing the mountain population to the northern steppe. At the same time Shamil's influence was waning. His tyranny bore heavily upon the villagers who, further, were weary of the constant warfare of a nature very different from their traditional raids; and his jealousy and nepotism alienated his lieutenants, the most famous of whom, Haji Murad, deserted to the Russians in 1851, as the result of a plot formed by Shamil against his life.

Simultaneously with the campaign against the eastern tribes the Russians had been engaged in long and tedious hostilities with the Cherkesses and Abkhazians. But the fighting in the Western Caucasus at no time attained to the intensity of that in Daghestan.

The Crimean War, which broke out in 1853, failed even to revive the fortunes of Shamil. The gross incompetence of the Turkish commanders in Armenia gave him little opportunity for co-operation, and he confined himself to two inconsiderable raids into Kakhetia. On the west the British fleet bombarded the Cossack posts along the coast, which afforded some relief to the Cherkesses, who still maintained a guerrilla war there.

In the autumn of 1855 a Turkish army of 20,000 men, under Omar Pasha, landed at Sukhum Kale, and after defeating a small Russian force on the Ingur advanced on Kutais. But the autumn rains made further operations by the badly-equipped Turkish army impossible, while the Mingrelians—much to the disgust of Laurence Oliphant, who was accompanying Omar—received the Turks with marked lack of enthusiasm. Omar reached Sugdidi, but was compelled to retire into winter quarters at Sukhum, whence his troops were withdrawn on the conclusion of the war.

At that time anti-Russian feeling was strong in England,

[1] Baddeley, pp. 373–4.

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At that time anti-Russian feeling was strong in England
175 and a number of fantastic propositions for the dismemberment
648 of the Muscovite Empire were being published. So influential a man as Lord Stratford de Redcliffe advocated the creation of an independent Circassia at the time of the Treaty of Paris, and in 1862 a number of enthusiastic public meetings at Dundee, Preston and elsewhere welcomed Cherkess deputies, who had come to England to petition the intervention of the Queen. But these efforts were of no avail. The Kars and Ingur campaigns had convinced responsible British statesmen that it was too late to attempt to retard the Russian absorption of the Caucasus, and the Treaty of Paris, by ignoring "the Circassian Question," gave the sanction of Europe to the Russian
175 position in those regions.

● [668] In 1859 Shamil, deserted by his followers, and surrounded
[59] by Russian forts, was driven from his last stronghold, Veden. Accompanied only by a hundred faithful *murtazeks*, he fled to the mountainous aul of Gunib in Southern Daghestan, where he subsequently surrendered.[1] The war-weary mountaineers had everywhere laid down their arms; the Russian conquest of the Eastern Caucasus was complete.

175 Five years later, in 1864, the last resistance of the Cherkesses
727 and Abkhazians was crushed. Nearly 500,000 of these unfortunate people, together with 100,000 Chechens, emigrated subsequently to Turkey, where the greater number died of disease and starvation.[2] They left their mountain homes a desert, but their place was gradually filled by Bohemian and Cossack immigrants.

During the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–8 there was some unrest amongst the remnants of the western tribes, but Turkish attempts to raise a general insurrection of the Mussulman mountaineers were ineffectual. As a result of the war, the Russians, by the Treaty of Berlin (1878), obtained almost the last remaining areas inhabited by the Caucasian races, Batum and the Ajar hills.

[1] After exile at Kaluga and Kiev, he died on a pilgrimage, at Medina, in 1871.

[2] Some thousand Cherkesses—Chapsughs, Ulikhs, Kabardans and Abkhazians
[66] —are settled in the vilayet of Sivas, others in that of Bitlis. The Chechens, after causing much trouble in the vilayets of Kars and Erzerum, finally scattered about the region of Bitlis, Van and Mush, while others settled in the vilayet of Diarbakr.

1 [i.e., during the Crimean War -- Analyst]

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Machabeli, who founded a daily paper. The style of this school was for the most part romantically patriotic, and it appealed primarily to the large and impoverished aristocratic class; but of all its disciples Ilia Chavchavadze alone had a following among the people. In general, the Russian Government had little to fear from the patriotic movement of the nobles; the majority of them served faithfully, some with distinction, in the Georgian regiments which played an important part in the Caucasian Campaign of 1877–8. Finally, the incorporation, in 1884, of the hitherto distinct Georgian army in the general military organisation of the Russian Empire marked the disappearance of the last remnant of the independence of the Georgian kingdom.

With the economic development of Transcaucasia the subversive social doctrines already spreading among the workmen of European Russia reached the Caucasus, and the Tiflis administration was confronted with a movement more real and more dangerous than the sentimental romanticism of the native princes. In 1870 European capital began to exploit Baku, and in the same year operations were begun at the great manganese deposits of Chiaturi. The construction of a railway line from Poti to Tiflis had been begun in 1867, and in 1883 this line was continued to Baku. In 1884 foreign capital, chiefly that of the Rothschilds, began to build a port at Batum. During the following thirty years the industrialisation of the Caucasus proceeded. Baku became one of the greatest petroleum centres of the world; further deposits of oil were exploited at Maikop and Grozni; another railway soon linked these towns with the Black Sea, the Caspian and Baku, and Russian, Armenian and foreign companies hastened to undertake the working of the rich manganese and copper deposits and the export of the silk, cotton, timber and wine of the country.

This sudden development soon produced the most complicated problems; antagonisms social and racial were presented in an acute form. The oil-towns were the foci of these antagonisms and the scene of the more sanguinary events of 1904–6, but the conditions there reacted on, and were reproduced in a lesser degree in, Georgia. Foreign capitalism was more than usually aggressive, as it believed itself to be operating in a new country where it was in a position to exploit cheap and inexhaustible supplies of uneducated native labour; and a sudden transition from feudalism to industrialism had created a labouring class the more dangerous because it could

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177.66 668 receive without assimilating all the latest doctrines of the semi-emancipated workers of Western Europe. And the great mass of casual labour—Gurians, Imeretians and Mingrelians—which flocked back to the villages every few months from the copper and manganese mines or the docks and oilcase factories at Batum, carried with them into the countryside the ill-comprehended doctrines of Marx and Engels which some agitator had muttered into their bucolic ears a few days before.

668 Thus it was not long before a branch of the Russian Social Democratic Party had been formed in Georgia, with local centres at Tiflis, Kutais, Poti and Batum. It was founded by Russians, but a number of able young Georgians were soon at its head. But they were journalists, artisans and lawyers who had replaced the former aristocrats of Chavchavadze's school as the leaders of Georgian opinion. Such were S. Gibladzé, "the pioneer of Georgian Socialism," Ninishvili, "the Georgian Gorki," and G. Tsereteli, the founder of the Socialist paper *Kvali*. The Social Democratic movement which professed to despise the Nationalist thought of Chavchavadze and based its theories on the class struggle, began to gain strength about the same time as the Imperial Government was initiating fresh anti-national measures, such as the forced emigration of the Ajars to Turkey (1880) and the enforcement of conscription in the Caucasus (1887). These measures doubtless drove many adherents into the Socialist ranks. In 1896 the railwaymen formed a first trade-union, [467] an example to be followed soon by the printers, iron-workers and other trades. In the same year Georgian Social Democracy received a brilliant recruit in Noah Jordania, who returned hot from the study of Marxism at Geneva to attack Ilia Chavchavadze in a series of articles in *Kvali*. Agitation was now gathering force, and in 1900 Prince Galitsin's Military Law, imposing liability to service in the remoter parts of the Empire, provoked a series of ugly strikes, as a result of which Jordania was arrested, and *Kvali* was suppressed, only to be revived by Irakli, son of Giorgi Tsereteli.

669 Towards the end of 1904 the revolutionary disturbances which had begun in European Russia spread to the Caucasus. The most blood-thirsty manifestations during the period 1904–6 took place at Baku and in the Armeno-Tatar regions, but the disaffection in Georgia was serious. In Tiflis bombs were thrown and officers were assassinated, while the Cossacks on more than one occasion inflicted cruel casualties on the crowd. Strikes took place along the Transcaucasian Railway,

[see cat. 116, pp 206-7 -- Analyst]

Chechens. They at first accepted the leadership of the Sheikh Uzun Hadji who proclaimed himself Imam and Emir of the Northern Caucasus. The Emir was the ally of the communists in the struggle against the White Guards of General Denikin. Having vanquished the White armies, the Bolsheviks dropped the Imam, but they were unable to cope with Chechen nationalism. The Chechens demanded the expulsion of all Russians who in the course of the last century had settled in their 'living space'. Pending a positive answer to this request Chechen nationalist bands terrorized the Russian population of the area beyond endurance. In the early twenties the Russian settlers in Chechenia sent a complaint to Moscow on account of the endless raids and murders perpetrated by Chechen bands, and petitioned that they be disarmed. Mikhail Kalinin went personally to the Caucasus and attempted to calm down both Russians and Chechens. With carefully chosen words he tried to persuade them to live together in peace, to intermarry and to respect each other's customs.[6] 669

Whilst in consequence of Kalinin's personal intervention banditry stopped in Chechenia, it would seem that Moslem opposition to the Soviet régime was never quite suppressed. In 1931 the little country still had 2,675 mosques and Arab schools, as well as 1,250 mullahs, 34 sheikhs and 250 religious elders. The mullahs who were powerful opponents of the Soviet régime even managed to keep alive the illegal Shariah courts which were camouflaged as 'reconciliation commissions'. [692] 668

The hostile attitude of the Chechens towards the Soviet Russian régime was often manifested in the readiness to credit the most fantastic anti-Russian rumours. Thus, in the early thirties, there existed a widespread belief that Kunta Hadji – the head of a popular Moslem sect who had died at the end of the nineteenth century – was still alive and was soon to return to Chechenia, where he would found a State based on Moslem religious law. Apparently the Chechens did not differentiate between Czarist and Bolshevik Russia in their hopes that Kunta Hadji would appear as Messiah, for it was he who had led them in the risings against Czarism in 1864 and 1877, for which he was exiled to Novgorod. [695]

The Ingush, whose fate Soviet policy had coupled with that of the Chechens, showed themselves no less loyal to Islam. A delegate who represented Ingushetia at the 'Second All-Union Conference of Godless Pedagogists' in 1931, stated that the influence of the Moslem clergy was still so strong among the Ingush that children refused to learn from books which they believed to be anti-religious. Whenever a teacher tried to introduce anti-religious propaganda he encountered a hostile attitude among school children and there were cases in which teachers had even to leave the school for having criticized Islam. The work of the secular Soviet schools, where the children were taught in the winter, was counteracted by the Moslem schools where the young Ingush would learn 771 871

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Ca. 175 177 actions against the Turks. An Ossetin Major-General, K. Zankisov, fought in Poland against the insurgents of 1863–4 and he was by no means the only Ossetin Major-General of that epoch. Furthermore, an 'Ossetin Division' became famous in the course of the Russo-Turkish War in 1877–8, when General Skobelev described its 'chivalrous gallantry' as being 'above any praise'.[12]

Ca. 177 538 Russian cultural work among the Ossetins started much earlier than among other mountain peoples. The first book to appear in the Ossetin language was printed in Moscow in 1798; its object was to serve as a kind of introduction to the study of the Bible. A long period of fruitful association with the Russians and the general peaceful approach of the Ossetins towards Russian military and political rule made them more open to the acceptance of Russian preponderance. The Ossetins were, as a matter of fact, the only people of the Northern Caucasus to produce a great writer in the person of Kosta Khetagurov (1859-1906) who was half Russianized himself and wrote in both the Ossetin and Russian languages. The Soviet régime greatly popularized Khetagurov as a symbol of Russian-Ossetin synthesis, which he undoubtedly was. He had a complete Russian education, had studied at St. Petersburg and was strongly influenced by such progressive Russian writers as Herzen and Chernishevsky, which makes him particularly acceptable from the Soviet point of view.

Ca. 423 448 474 681 Until the Ossetins gave proof of their loyalty to Russia during the war the Soviet régime had had to overcome Ossetin resistance to both the establishment of collective farms and the suppression of tribal customs. During the period of the collectivization Ossetin peasants waged a sort of guerilla warfare against 'socialist property' and while outwardly accepting collectivization, tried to transform the Kolkhoz into an instrument of their respective clans. Ossetin chairmen of collective farms and officials of local Soviets seem to have acted on the principle 'I decide who is a kulak and an enemy of the State and who is not'. Thus, at least during its initial stage, collectivization in Ossetia became a downright farce. Persons belonging to a rival clan were rendered innocuous by being denounced as kulaks; real kulaks, on the other hand, were promoted to the rank of respectable Soviet citizens if they happened to belong to the clan dominating the local village council or the collective farm concerned.[13]

Ca. [725] 631 142 S.U. 563 634 All such 'incidents' were forgotten when the Ossetins redeemed their reputation by their brilliant war record. In the fighting which resulted in the dislodgement of the Germans from the approaches to the Caucasus, Ossetin partisans operating from behind the enemy lines greatly assisted the Red Army.[14] As a mark of appreciation for their loyalty, the Soviet Government allowed the Ossetins to increase substantially the territory of their national republic. A decree of April 8th, 1944, stipulated